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In the past six years, methodological efforts to frame the issue of weak states have led
to indices that rank states on the bases of a range of social, political, economic and
security variables. Contestations and violent intercommunal conflict in Chad, Cote
d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria, Rwanda,
Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan and Zimbabwe or so-called ‘trouble spots’ in Africa (to
quote a recent article in the Baker 2008: A17), are evidence of the
chasms and domestic anarchy in countries that have been described variously as weak,
failing or collapsed.
A recent version of these indices is the Index of State Weakness in the Developed
World published by Brookings Institution and prepared by Susan Rice and Stewart
Patrick (2008); their work relies on a set of indicators to characterize all aspects of state
weakness. Other examples include the Fragile States Briefs produced by Country
Indicators for Foreign Policy Project at Carleton University that begun in 2006; State
Fragility Index (2007) produced by Monty Marshall and Jack Goldstone at George
Mason University; Failed States Index which started in 2005 and is produced by the
Fund for Peace. These reports are based on an array of indicators including social,
economic, political, security, crime, human development or social welfare and
environment which are combined to create a composite score of state performance.
Variations of the index methodology also include the report (2004) released by the
Commission on Weak States and US National Security, which discusses threats of
weak states to the US, and the Ibrahim Index of African Governance at the Harvard
University Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs (2007), which focuses
on ‘political goods’ such as safety and security, rule of law, transparency and
corruption, participation and human rights, sustainable economic opportunity and
human development. The Peace and Conflict Instability Ledger developed at the
University of Maryland (Hewitt, Wilkenfeld and Gurr 2008) is an exemplar of these
indexes. The conceptual frame is a familiar one: the incidence of instability or armed
conflict can be forecasted if we know the extent of democracy, economic freedom,
social development, militarization and regional armed conflict.
Generally, these indexes are based on models that relate collapses in the economy
and civil society to major violent intercommunal conflict such as domestic unrests,
riots, insurgencies, armed conflicts, civil conflicts or wars. State weakness, failure and
eventual collapse are also catalyzed by another critical dimension: the proliferation of
small arms (Klare 1994, 2004).
Alatent variable in these constructs is ethnic differences: the recognition that ethnic
(and religious) enmity is correlated with the incidence of intercommunal conflict or
wars and state weakness. Rotberg (2004, 5) thinks that ‘civil wars ... usually stem from
or have roots in ethnic, religious, linguistic or other intercommunal enmity’. The ‘fear
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of the other that drives so much of ethnic conflict stimulates and fuels hostilities
between regimes’.
But, the role of ethnic differences or a certain ethnic enmity in intercommunal
conflict is indeed a puzzling one; when long-time neighbours become enemies
overnight based on ethnic or religious affiliation or loyalty is this in response to state
breakdown? When long-time neighbours become marauding killers overnight, isn’t
this the result of a collapse of state authority, rather than merely the result of deep-
seated ethnic or religious enmity? But if there were no underlying ethnic or religious
differences or enmity, why the seemingly precipitous change in social relations and
interactions? As Nelson Kasfir (2004, 54) argues, there is ‘more probably going on
than can be accounted for by the cultural or ideological cleavages that predate
outbreaks of violence’ in the countries experiencing intercommunal conflict.
My research argument is that if ethnic differences – what we know also in sub-
Saharan Africa as a certain latent ‘tribalism’ – are to blame for community conflicts, it
is predicated on a certain level of metaphorical social distance between social groups,
or its proxy measures, ethnic identification and attachment. I use ethnic identification
and attachment as proxy measures because precise social distance data are currently
unavailable for sub-Saharan Africa. In this paper, I write about the results of
differences in terms of ethnic identification and ethnic attachment in a sample of sub-
Saharan countries (for which there are data). I pose the following research questions:
what do these measures tell us about the strength of ethnicity? And does this construct
add to our understanding of the role of tribalism in intercommunal conflict in the
region? Let me give a background to this argument.
We are aware that a key variable in understanding the nature of armed conflict is the
level of unregulated small arms and light weapons circulating freely on the black
market since the end of the Cold War. Gamba (1998), Lumpe (2000) and Boutwell and
Klare (2000) among others, have written about the role of illegal small and light
weapons moving unchecked across porous borders globally. During the Cold War,
arms transfers were made from government to government under the patronage of
super powers. After the Cold War and since the 1980s, arms are transferred from
government to self-styled insurgents and guerrilla movements facilitated by
globalization and stockpiles of arms left over from the Cold War (Small Arms Survey
2001, 2006). These weapons are readily available because they are inexpensive,
portable, easy to conceal and use (Klare 1999).
In the movie, (2005), inspired by actual events and starring Nicholas
Cage, the global networks of illegal arms trading are starkly rendered; recently, a
widely publicized arrest of a Russian linked to the trade was made in Thailand (March
2008). The question, however, is: what is the relationship between official state
stockpiles and availability of (licit and illicit) small arms in any community? The Small
Arms Survey (2006) argues that in ‘poorer’ states where security is weak and
governments are unstable, stockpiles of arms make armed conflict more likely. There
is some recognition that the licit and illicit commerce in small arms are related; this is
because arms that are acquired and exported legally, but not adequately monitored
eventually find their way on the black market. While the SmallArms Survey estimates
1
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the volume of illegal arms circulating in sub-Saharan African and globally, it is
difficult to ascertain the flows of these arms and to intercept them prior to the incidence
of armed conflict in any particular country; it is only when community tensions
become full blown armed conflicts that our collective attentions are drawn to the
existence of these weapons.
The availability of these weapons encourages warfare or violence as a method of
conflict resolution. And when there are any community differences (cultural/ethnic,
social, economic or political), these inexpensive and portable weapons only worsen
community clashes by extending the duration of violence.
The ethnic diversity and heterogeneity in Africa does not necessarily have to be
baneful; like any region, these diverse African cultures have lived in harmony and
experienced conflict; however, the finding that cultural differences are significantly
related to intercommunal conflict (Atiku-Abubakar and Shaw-Taylor 2003) in sub-
Saharan Africa suggests a residual persistence of perceptions of ethnic superiority
(from the pre-independence era) rather unlike racism in its economic and political
outcomes (inequities); in that, patronage based on family and kinship ties and networks
of ethnic interest trump other networks in society. This phenomenon of ethnocentrism
is analogous to the historical phenomenon of ‘tribalism,’ with its baggage of adherence
to tradition and allegiance to tribal identification (Young 1994, Glickman, 1995).
The immediate pre-independence period focused efforts on building nationalism
and nation-states comprising various ethnic groups; this programme of modern nation-
states and nationalists was less focused on ethnic patronage (Davidson 1992,Apter and
Rosberg 1994). The argument was that so-called ‘tribal unions’ or ‘tribal associations’
did not have any place in the emergent post-colonial nations; the new nationalism was
based on a progressive ideal of a community of diverse ethnic groups and the ‘savage
backwoods’ of the pre-colonial era was to be abandoned. There was tension between
the so-called traditionalists, the chiefs and the favoured citizens of the pre-colonial
ethnic nations and the new nationalists as these newly African countries gained
independence. The realities of social conflict were apparent; Davidson (1992:111), for
instance, notes that the ‘new political parties (being formed in the African countries)
drew authentic and sometimes overwhelming popular support from their ethnic roots’.
Independence movements that once acted in the name of national independence
grappled with the potential of devolving into ethnic sub-divisions. The post-
independence period therefore, became a project tracking the challenges of
nationalism and the hydra of ethnic allegiances (Rothchild 1997, Kieh and Mukenge
2002, Nnoli 1998, Irobi 2005). The challenge then, was how to mitigate the role of
ethnic loyalty or tribalism in the immediate post-independence nationalist project. The
challenge now, is how to mitigate the flow of small arms so that ethnic differences,
where they exist, do not become full-blown violent and tragic conflicts pitting ethnic
groups against one another.
I use country-merged data from Afrobarometer surveys conducted from 1999 to 2001
(round 1) and in 2004 (round 2). Since 1999, Afrobarometer surveys have been an
important source of survey data in Africa on public attitudes about democracy,
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social distance were not collected in rounds 1 and 2. The surveys use clustered
stratified multi-stage area probability samples of citizens 18 years or older.
Respondents are administered face-to-face interviews based on a structured
questionnaire. Twelve countries were surveyed in round 1 including Botswana,
Ghana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda,
Zambia and Zimbabwe yielding a sample size of 19,527; for round 2, four more
countries were added: Cape Verde, Kenya, Mozambique and Senegal yielding a
sample size of 24,248. A minimum sample size of 1,200 cases (or slightly less) was
selected for each country; larger sample sizes were drawn from Nigeria Uganda,
Kenya and South Africa. The surveys are conducted through a collaboration of social
scientists in African countries. The project is coordinated by the Institute for
Democracy in South Africa (Idasa), the Center for Democratic Development (CDD-
Ghana) and Michigan State University. The project has received funding from the
Swedish International Development CooperationAgency, the Netherlands Ministry of
ForeignAffairs, the USAgency for International Development, the Danish Ministry of
ForeignAffairs, and the Department of International Development (UK).
Importantly, the multi-stage area probability sample design uses probability
proportionate to population size method. Each country sample ‘is by key
social characteristics in the population such as sub-national area (e.g. region/province)
and residential locality (urban or rural).
(emphasis mine)
And the urban/rural stratification is a means to make sure that these localities are
represented in their correct proportions’ (Afrobarometer Sampling document:
http://www.afrobarometer.org/sampling.html; accessedApril 2008). This is important
for our analytical purposes to ensure that country samples contain the spread of ethnic
groups and that all ethnic groups are represented.
A review of the questionnaire yielded the following items for analytic purposes; in
round 1, these include:
Curiously and inexplicably, the items ‘ and ‘ were
not asked of respondents in Ghana, Mali, Tanzania and Uganda in round 1. The root
question item about identity was not asked of respondents in Ghana.
In round 2, the ‘ question was not fielded, and the ‘
item was revised to read: ‘Which of these two groups do you feel most strongly




The area stratification reduces the likelihood
that distinctive ethnic or language groups are left out of the sample .
group is best’ stronger ties to group’
group is best’ stronger ties to
group’
stronger ties to group’
(1) ‘Besides being (insert nationality), which specific group do you feel you belong to
first and foremost’. This is a root identification question. This ‘ question is
open-ended and responses were post-hoc classified into 15 categories which included
the core categories of ethnicity, race, religion, occupation, class, gender, party, and
continental.
(2) ‘Of all groups in this country, (members of your identity group) are the best.’
This item is a dimension of ethnic attachment – this ‘ question uses
Likert scale responses.
(3) ‘You feel much stronger ties to (members of your identity group) than to other
(people of your nationality)?’ This item is the other measure of ethnic attachment. This
‘ question uses Likert scale responses.
identification’
group is best’
stronger ties to group’
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round 1 to be dichotomous as was done in round 2. The root question ‘ in
round 2 was not revised. To fit a general linear model, I recoded the ‘ and
the ‘ variables in both rounds to be dichotomous as well.
I hypothesize that countries that have had intercommunal conflict would have
significantly higher proportions of respondents choosing tribal or ethnic identification
and attachment (besides nationality). Specifically, I argue that the countries described
as ‘trouble spots’ (for which there are data) including Kenya, Nigeria and Zimbabwe
will show higher proportions of respondents reporting tribal or ethnic identification
and attachment when compared to the other countries in the sample. I argue that if this
is the case, these countries may be arguably more tribalistic or ethnocentric when
compared to the others.
Now, this research design is bounded by the fact that ethnic identification and
attachment could be the of past ethnic violence and conflict. In which case,
attachment to ethnicity or tribalism may actually be the outcome (not the cause) of
(past) ethnic violence. Ideally, of course, this can be tested only with an experimental
(or quasi-experimental) design, where we would capture ethnic identification and
attachment pre and post conflict. I do not attempt to achieve such a design in this study.
Rather, I use a correlational design that does not make any declarations about causality.
I used reliability analysis to assess whether the two questionnaire items from survey
round 1, and have a common factor. I
used frequency distributions and the contrasts function in the GENMOD procedure in
SAS to test whether proportions of respondents in each country are significantly
different based on ethnic identification, and those who say their ethnic group is best or
who say they have stronger ties to their ethnic group. In round 2 (2004), the tests were
repeated but only for ethnic identification and respondents who have stronger ties to
their group. The GENMOD procedure is appropriate because it allows for the
estimation of user-defined contrasts in a linear model through a nonlinear link function
when the response or dependent variable is non-continuous (in this case, dichotomous)
and the predictor (independent) variable is categorical. This procedure is based on the
normal approximation for proportions. I used the binomial distribution option and
asked for test of differences among least squares means.
Cronbach’s alpha yielded a coefficient of 0.9 indicating that we cannot reject my
contention that and measure a common factor I call
(ethnic) attachment.Ahigh alpha coefficient means the items are positively correlated.
Table 1 presents data from round 1 showing ethnic identification or percent of
respondents choosing ethnic group or tribe as main identity group besides nationality.
Generally, most respondents in surveyed countries in this round chose sub-national
identities when asked to identify one, but in Botswana, 32.9 percent or 1 out of 3
respondents chose not to differentiate by sub national group. By comparison, in each of
the other countries less than two percent of respondents chose not to differentiate by
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Table 1: Besides nationality, which specific identity group do you feel you
belong to first and foremost?
Country Tribe/Ethnicity Identity Group with highest %
Botswana 28.9% Won’t differentiate, 32.9








Tanzania 3.0 Occupation, 76.4
Uganda 11.8 Occupation, 62.0
Zambia 7.7 Religion, 32.9
Zimbabwe 36.0* Tribe/Ethnicity
In this round, less than a tenth of respondents in three countries, Lesotho, Tanzania and
Zambia (1.9, 3 and 7.7 percent respectively) chose ethnicity or tribe as their
identification group other than nationality. In Uganda, ethnic identification is also
comparatively low. In these countries, more respondents chose occupation or religion
for identification. But, notably, approximately one out of two respondents in Nigeria
(47.4 percent) and Namibia (43 percent) chose tribe or ethnicity. Approximately one
out of three (36 percent) Zimbabweans chose ethnicity. The proportion for Nigeria is
significantly higher when compared to all the other countries except Namibia. The
proportion for Zimbabwe is significantly higher when compared to Lesotho, South
Africa, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia, but not significantly higher or different in
comparison to Botswana, Malawi, Mali and Namibia.
Results in table 2 are based on the sub-sample of respondents who chose ethnic
identification besides nationality (from table 1). In this table, Nigeria emerges as the
country with significantly higher proportions of respondents expressing attachment to
ethnic group when compared to Malawi, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe (all
countries with comparatively higher proportions of respondents choosing ethnic
identification – see table 1). The proportion of Zimbabweans saying their ethnic group
is best is not significantly higher when compared to Malawi (but the estimate is
significantly lower than in Namibia and South Africa). The proportion of
Zimbabweans expressing stronger ties to their ethnic group is significantly higher
when compared to Malawi, (but again, this estimate is significantly lower than in
Namibia and SouthAfrica).
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Table 2:Attachment to Ethnic Group Identity
Table 3: Besides nationality, which specific identity group do you feel you




South Africa 70.9 78.3
Zambia 50.4 69.8*
Botswana 53.7% 24.8% Tribe/Ethnicity
Ghana 39.4 Tribe/Ethnicity
Lesotho 55.6 53.7 Tribe/Ethnicity
Malawi 14.8 -24.3 Occupation, 42.0%
Mali 36.0 -2.5 Tribe/Ethnicity
Of all groups in this You feel much stronger
country, members of ties to ethnic group
your ethnic group are than to other nationals
Country the best of country
Country Tribe/Ethnicity Change from Group identity with
Round 1 highest %
* p < .01
In round 2, the analysis was expanded to include 16 countries. Like table 1, table 3
shows percent of respondents choosing ethnic group or tribe as main identity group
besides nationality. Clearly, more respondents in more countries chose occupation
rather than tribe or ethnic group when asked about attachments to social group in this
survey round; this includes one of the countries of interest, Kenya, where,
approximately one out of three made this choice.And in Zimbabwe approximately one
out of every three respondents chose religion when asked about attachments to social
group. Note that while the proportion of respondents in Nigeria, the first country of
interest, in this survey is comparable to the previous round (47.4 percent in round 1
versus 49.3 percent in round 2), the proportion of Zimbabweans has dropped by 25
percent (36 percent in round 1 versus 10.9 percent in round 2). In fact, the proportions
of respondents choosing ethnic identification (besides nationality) in Zimbabwe
together with South Africa (10.8 percent), Zambia (13.3 percent) and Cape Verde (1.1
percent) were the lowest among the countries in this survey round. Although the
proportion in Zambia has almost doubled, it is still among the lowest.
There are some notable increases in proportions of respondents choosing ethnic or
tribal identification as well. Lesotho and Tanzania which had previously reported low
proportions of respondents choosing ethnic identification in round 1 are reporting
increases of 53.7 percent and 23.3 percent respectively in round 2. In Botswana, 53.7
percent of respondents now choose ethnic identification, an increase of almost 25
percent. There are notable decreases as well; proportions in Malawi and Namibia
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Country Tribe/Ethnicity Change from Group identity with
Round 1 highest %
Most strongly attached to
Country ethnic group identity
Namibia 20.9 -22.1 Gender, 33.6
Nigeria 49.3* 1.9 Tribe/Ethnicity
SouthAfrica 10.8 -10.8 Occupation, 31.0
Tanzania 26.3 23.3 Occupation, 52.5
Uganda 20.2 8.4 Occupation, 55.2
Zambia 13.3 5.6 Religion, 25.8
Cape Verde 1.1 Occupation, 30.1
Kenya 19.4* Occupation, 55.6
Mozambique 28.9 Occupation, 46.2






* p < .01
* p < .01
The proportion of Nigerians choosing ethnic identification is significantly higher
when compared to the other countries, except for Botswana and Lesotho. Of the other
two countries of interest, Kenya and Zimbabwe, only 19.4 percent and 10.9 percent of
respondents chose tribe or ethnic identification besides nationality; that is
approximately one out five respondents chose ethnicity or tribe in Kenya and
approximately one out of ten chose tribe in Zimbabwe; note the difference in the
proportions choosing ethnicity or tribe from round 1. The proportions of Zimbabweans
choosing ethnic identification is significantly lower when compared to all the other
countries except South Africa and Cape Verde, and the proportions of Kenyans
choosing ethnic identification is significantly lower when compared to all other
countries except Malawi, SouthAfrica, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Cape Verde.
Similar to table 2, results in table 4 are restricted to countries where more respondents
chose ethnic identification besides nationality (from table 3); compared to the other
countries, the estimate of respondents in Nigeria is significantly higher than in Ghana
and Lesotho, but not in Botswana or Mali.
Results from these analyses are mixed; we cannot reject the hypotheses when it comes
to Nigeria, but our hypotheses do not hold for Kenya and Zimbabwe. In the first survey
round, while results from Nigeria allow us to maintain the hypotheses of greater ethnic
Table 4:Attachment to Ethnic Group Identity
Discussion and Conclusion
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identification and attachment, Zimbabwe’s rates of ethnic identification were only
significantly different for countries where ethnic identification was low (except South
Africa). For ethnic attachment, the results for Zimbabwe are not conclusive and so I
cannot say that Zimbabwe has higher rates of ethnic attachment. In round 2, Nigeria
again confirms the hypotheses, but here again, the hypotheses of higher rates of ethnic
identification and attachment do not hold for Kenya and Zimbabwe.
Nigeria is an exemplar of the ethnic identification and attachment as evidenced by
their post-colonial history and past conflicts (for example, the Biafran war) and the
current insurgency in the Niger Delta. But the cases of Kenya and Zimbabwe need
explication.
In news reports (Gettleman 2008, ), the recent (January-March,
2008) conflicts in Kenya were attributed to ethnic enmity or differences as members of
Kikuyu and Luo ethnic groups visited violence on each other. My analyses show that
most Kenyans do not identify themselves ethnically or tribally; so what explains the
ethnic violence? What my analyses don’t do is investigate the interaction of
socioeconomic class and ethnicity or tribal attachment. Since more Kenyans identify
themselves by occupational group, a reasonable next step would be to look into how
class differences interact with ethnic or tribal differences.
It is not clear that the conflict in Zimbabwe is based on ethnic or tribal differences;
the rates of ethnic attachment, especially, in both survey rounds were not remarkable.
Although Mugabe’s regime has been accused of complicity in the deaths of thousands
of members of the Ndebele ethnic group in 1983, the current turmoil stems from
governmental or political intransigence and an economy crippled by a messy land
redistribution programme. The results of the analyses suggest that a mapping of the
root causes of the conflict in Zimbabwe perhaps should begin with an in-depth
examination of the structure of political power and the distribution of ‘political goods’
in Zimbabwe and not ethnic or tribal differences or enmity.
It is noteworthy that only three of the countries experiencing intercommunal
conflict are included in this study; data from Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, DR Congo, Liberia,
Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Sudan would provide more opportunity to test and
hone the hypotheses.
There are other intriguing findings here; while the rate of respondents choosing
ethnicity did not change for Nigeria and Mali, in Botswana, Lesotho and Tanzania,
ethnic identification increased markedly from round 1 to round 2. In Malawi, Namibia
and Zimbabwe, ethnic identification declined considerably between survey rounds. It
is not clear what caused these rates to change or if we should be concerned about them,
and whether or not these rate changes may indicate non-sampling errors in the design
of the surveys.
The analyses shows Zambia to be the least ethnocentric or tribalistic; in Zambia,
ethnic identification and attachment is minimal, and this is not for want of different
ethnic or tribal groups. In both rounds, less than 14 percent of respondents expressed
ethnic identification or attachment. A closer study of Zambia’s ethno-social landscape
would inform this discourse. Ghana and Mali (in both rounds) are interesting cases
because they have comparatively high rates of ethnic identification and attachment,
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Finally, although considerable progress has been made in describing weak states,
identifying their characteristics and predicting their political instability, what is
lacking, I argue, is a mapping of exactly how ethnicity or tribalism, or precisely, social
distance between ethnic groups contributes to community violence. The results from
this analyses show that this role is nuanced and tribalism or ethnocentrism cannot
always be fingered singularly in intercommunal conflicts – at best, tribalism interacts
with other factors to create conflicts (compare Kenya and Zimbabwe). A precise
measurement of ethnic social distance will help us distil its main effect and allow us to
make predictions about the level of ethnic antipathies or antagonisms before they blow
up into tragic violent confrontations. The Afrobarometer surveys provide a platform
for measuring ethnic social distance in sub-SaharanAfrica.
Notes
1. The conventional social distance scale developed by Emory Bogardus (1926) was derived
from the dual conceptual foundations of geometric (spatial) and metaphoric distance
although a precise measurement of geometric distance is suppressed in the Bogardus scale
(Ethington 1997). At any rate, the social distance scale remains one of the enduring and
successful concepts in sociology, and Bogardus’s original version yielded a ‘racial distance
quotient’ measured on a seven point cumulative scale that showed the extent to which
respondents would accept a member of a racial out-group.Ascore of 1.00 indicates no social
distance. The cumulative questions are as follows: Would willingly admit members of each
race: (1) To close kinship by marriage; (2) To my club as personal chums; (3) To my street as
neighbours; (4) to employment in my occupation in my country, (5) To citizenship in my
country; (6) As visitors in my country, (7) Would exclude from my country. As reported by
Philip Ethington (1997) this scale or some modification of it, has been applied in over 300
studies of gender, class or status, to examine social distance or social relations.
2. Basil Davidson (1992), page 113, quoting Attoh Ahuma’s 1911 book
.
3. The latest full questionnaire is obtainable at: http://www.afrobarometer.org/questionnaires/
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